One of my favorite aspects of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) is that if the FAR does not specifically prohibit an action, then it is deemed to be permissible, up to the limit of authority bestowed by a given contracting officer’s warrant.  That permissiveness is a hallmark of the acquisition reforms that have occurred since the mid-1990s, wherein the federal government sought to make procurement processes quicker, more streamlined and less administratively burdensome.  One particular event in my past experience highlights the significance of that permissiveness and has come to be a cornerstone of my acquisition philosophy.

During my last deployment to Afghanistan, I served as the Chief of Contracting at the Regional Contracting Center at Camp Dwyer in Helmand Province.  As the Chief, I had a certain amount of authority that transcended my warrant threshold ($10 million).  Basically, I possessed the approval authority for decisions and actions that warranted contracting officers did not hold – kind of an internal review system that helped ensure procurement integrity and compliance.  One example of this administrative authority is the concept of Unauthorized Commitments – contracting officers could prepare ratifications of the UCs, but the Chief retained approval authority, meaning I had to bless the ratification before it was official.  This authority is described in FAR Part 1.602-3 — Ratification of Unauthorized Commitments, in subsection (b)(3): “the ratification authority in subparagraph (b)(2) of this subsection may be delegated in accordance with agency procedures, but in no case shall the authority be delegated below the level of chief of the contracting office.”  Hence, even the smallest ratification required the Chief’s approval to be valid.

I write all of that to provide some context to the rather humorous scenario I found myself in during that deployment.  Our office supported a Marine Regimental Combat Team that had a dual mission – to prosecute the war against the insurgent forces (Taliban), as well as to train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to eventually assume responsibility for the fight so that American forces could withdraw.  To help bolster the Afghan troops’ spirits and confidence, the US commanders wanted to support their host-nation partners’ holiday celebration of Eid by providing goats to be slaughtered for a feast.  And thus arose a problem that brings into focus the permissiveness of the FAR that I have come to appreciate so well.

The unit could not legally purchase food using their operational funds, and the unit commanders were not of sufficient rank and position to warrant “representational” funds, which are used by generals and diplomats to pay for official functions with foreign dignitaries.  Moreover, we as contracting officers were prohibited from contracting for the purchase of animals, as prescribed in the Acquisition Instructions (derived from the FAR and DFARs) that guided US forces’ procurement activities in Afghanistan.  However, I could find no such limitation on Field Ordering Officers, or FOOs, from purchasing animals, provided they could justify the request.

FOOs are unit representatives that undergo special acquisition training, and receive purchasing authority delegated from a contracting officer.  The idea is that contracting officers stay pretty busy, and rather than waste their precious time with a myriad of small, routine purchases, they can delegate limited procurement authority (usually up to the micro-purchase threshold) to trained personnel, and thereby focus on the higher-dollar, more complex acquisitions.  At any rate, in my research in the FAR, DFARs, and Acquisition Instructions, I could not find a prohibition on FOOs buying animals, so long as mission requirements warranted the purchase.

Therefore, I drafted a decision paper wherein I, as the Chief of Contracting, authorized the FOOs to buy sufficient quantities of goats to provide to the ANSF forces in support of their Eid celebration.  The decision paper cited the commanders’ justifications that this symbolic and heartfelt gesture would greatly improve the morale and spirit of cooperation amongst the Afghan soldiers, thereby making it a mission-essential requirement.  The total estimated cost amounted to $7,000, so in a military operation that spent upwards of $5 billion each month, such a paltry sum did not even constitute a rounding error.  Nevertheless, it was the taxpayers’ money, and I went to great lengths to articulate and justify the expenditure within the overall context of the US forces’ mission.

Unfortunately, the legal counsel that supported my contracting office did not concur with my logic and recommended that I deny the units’ request to purchase the goats.  That particular lawyer sympathized with my dilemma, but felt that I was assuming too much personal risk in making a questionable decision that was not clearly authorized in any known regulations.  I took that counsel under close advisement, but in the end, I believe that if a combat commander feels that it is important to buy and slaughter a few goats in order to help him accomplish his very difficult mission of training native troops for war, then it is my job to get him those goats.  Since I could not find a prohibition against such an action, I approved the purchase.  The Afghans got their goats, the unit commanders were satisfied, I did not suffer any personal or professional blowback and the war did not even notice.  All in all, I call that a success.  And I think it serves to illustrate how flexible and permissive the FAR truly is, if the contracting officer is creative enough, and daring enough, to take advantage of that latitude.