The basic design of government acquisition is closely tied to the system of checks and balances found in the federal government and its three branches. I do not think this is accidental, but directly related, and for the same reason – accountability. In the federal system of government, powers are split between the three branches to prevent one branch from gaining too much control over a process or function, and it also requires a large degree of consensus within and amongst those branches. This means that most controversial policy decisions or legislation must be supported by most of the elected representatives of the people of the nation. The three branches check each other from consolidating too much power and are balanced by the divided responsibilities: Congress makes the laws, the Executive implements and enforces the laws, and the Judiciary ensures the laws are Constitutional and interprets them when challenged.
Government acquisition is set up in a similar fashion. The three ‘deciders’ in government procurement are the requiring activity (including the end user), the funding source and funds controller, and the contracting officer and supporting staff. These functions are divided to ensure that applicable laws are followed to control fraud, waste and abuse. For instance, the system functions such that the person or organization that needs the goods or services cannot be the same person managing the funding, nor the contracting officer signing the contract. This helps reduce (but not eliminate) the possibility of fraud or corruption, by requiring at least three people and their functional organizations to agree on the procurement. And the procurement involves several factors, including the definition of the requirement, the expected cost, the evaluation of proposed offers, and the selection of the winning offer.
Taking a closer look at the specific roles, we see that a contracting officer external to the using committee is a good idea, because that person can remain objective and work to ensure the government gets the best value for its money. The CO does not care what is being bought, so long as it is being bought the right way; this decider cares about the ‘how.’ Alternatively, the using committee does not really care how much something costs, nor how it is bought, so long as it does what the using committee needs it to do. This decider cares about the ‘what.’ And the third decider, the financier, does not care what is being bought, or how it is being bought, but cares very much about how much it costs. This decider cares about the ‘why’ and ‘when’ of the procurement. In other words, the financial manager cares that the using community has a need that justifies spending money on it and if the need is urgent enough to spend this year’s money on it, rather than deferring the buy for the next fiscal year.
Thus, we see the shared accountability: the person that needs the good or service does not have authority to buy it, but must request the funds from someone and the contracting expertise from someone else. The person signing the contract does not have a stake in what is bought, as long as it is done correctly, and the funding source just needs to ensure that sufficient funds are provided and spent properly. No one person controls any aspect of the decision, which helps keep everyone involved honest. The three deciders must work together, and agree, in order to execute the procurement, and the shared accountability maintains the integrity of the process.
I find that the effectiveness of the checks and balances more than justifies the bureaucratic burden, because in the end, the money being spent belongs to the US taxpayer, so the integrity must be maintained. Even though it is a hassle getting the three parties to work together, let alone getting the industry counterparts to understand the system and the process, it is worth the effort.